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The Internet as a platform for peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions has extended to job search,
dating, social networks, and recently consumer lending. While search cost savings may explain
part of the growth, it is puzzling how commodities that feature signiﬁcant information asym-
metry between buyers and sellers can ﬂourish on the Internet. Take consumer lending as an
example. Since the P2P platforms keep individual borrowers and lenders anonymous to each
other, the extent of information asymmetry is likely to be exaggerated and Akerlof (1970) type
adverse selection could be more salient online than oﬄine. Nevertheless, P2P lending has ﬂour-
ished on the Internet, even in the midst of a credit crisis. To what extent and by what channels
can P2P lenders overcome the information problems about borrower risk? The answer to this
question is not only important for the long-run viability of these online markets, but it will also
deepen our understanding on the role of information in markets.
Using transaction level data from the largest P2P lending platform in the US (Prosper.com),
we show that learning by doing is an important tool for lenders in alleviating their information
problems about borrower risk. Unlike traditional banks, Prosper lenders have access to only
part of a borrower’s credit history. The online market is so new that it is uncertain to what
extent borrowers adversely select Prosper because they cannot get credit from oﬄine lenders.
Additionally, every Prosper loan is unsecured, on a ﬁxed length of three years, and non-tradable
during our data period. Borrowers were also disallowed to borrow more than one loan on
Prosper until the end of our sample. These institutional features restrict a lender’s ability
to improve actions on a speciﬁc borrower. However, lenders may infer market-wide risk by
observing outcomes of existing loans. In this sense, the learning by doing in our context is
broader than private learning of idiosyncratic individual risk2 and more similar to market-wide
learning concerning the incentive to gather private information and the overall eﬃciency of a
market.
In theory, traders that are eager to know a market-wide parameter (say the return of common
stocks) may not have enough incentive to gather private information because market price may
reﬂect all of the information that the rest of the market has gathered (Fama 1970). As shown in
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), when information is costly, such an eﬃcient equilibrium is replaced
by an equilibrium where informed traders know more than uninformed traders and price is a
noisy signal of the information that the informed traders learn. Both equilibria can be reached
2Many empirical studies focus on the information asymmetry on a speciﬁc subject – for example, the quality
of a particular used car, the risk of an insured individual (see Cohen and Sigelman 2009 for a summary), the
default risk of a particular borrower (Sharpe 1990), or the ability of a particular worker (Schonberg 2007) – while
assuming the less informed party has a correct understanding on the statistical distribution of the risk.
1dynamically if traders start with private information, trade the asset repeatly and observe market
price every round. However, the dynamic evolution is slow (Vives 1993), depends on the form of
learning,3 and does not necessarily converge to the informationally eﬃcient equilibrium (Jun and
Vives 1996). Since learning can be private, heterogeneous, slow, and divergent, it is important
to document the pattern and strength of learning in a new market like P2P lending.4
The information to be learned on Prosper.com is the true average risk of borrowers with a
speciﬁc observable attribute. Since the market is new, signals that most likely inform the risk
of a prospective borrower are historical performance of similar loans. Prosper.com publicizes
monthly performance of every existing loan, but the extent to which a lender understands such
information depends on the lender’s attention to his own portfolio, awareness of market-wide
performance data, as well as his time cost and ability to digest the information. In theory, a
lender may learn directly from his own understanding of performance data, or indirectly from
market price which aggregates the understanding of historical loan performance of other lenders.5
Since we observe every lender’s portfolio and every loan’s payment history on any day, we can
characterize how each lender learns from the pool of loan performance signals without making
explicit assumption about the informational role of market price.6
We ﬁnd that lenders, especially those that joined Prosper early, have systematically under-
estimated borrower risk, even after we account for the unexpected ﬁnancial crisis beginning in
August 2007. But over time, lenders learn vigorously from their own mistakes. We show that
a lender is more likely to stop funding any new loans as more of his existing loans are late,
and conditional on funding new loans, the new loans shy away from the credit grade (or other
observable attributes) of the mis-performing loans in his portfolio.
Interestingly, learning from one’s own mistakes is stronger than learning from the portfolio
performance of other lenders in the same social group. This suggests that part of the learning
3If each trader is endowed with one private signal, the common wisdom is that rational learning (with Bayesian
updating) will lead to an equibrium in which the price is fully informative (Townsend 1978, Feldman 1987) but
adaptive learning (learning by rule of thumb) may or may not result in such convergence (Blume and Easley 1982
and Marcet and Sargent 1988). When it is costly to acquire private information, Routledge (1999) shows that
adaptive learning will lead to an asymptotic convergence to the Grossman-Stiglitz (GS) equilibrium if the process
involves monotonic selection.
4Many experimental studies of learning focus on a textbook setting of game theory; see Cooper, Gavin and
Kagel (1997) for an example of adaptive learning Salmon (2001) for a review of how economists identify reinforce-
ment learning from belief learning in lab experiments.
5Note that Prosper loans are not tradable in our sample period. If a lender funds a bad loan by mistake, it
does not imply any direct ﬁnancial loss for those that did not fund the loan at its origination date. In this sense,
our context is simpler than what is considered in the noise trader literature (De Long et al. 1990 and follow ups).
6To the extent that market price aggregates how other lenders process the loan performance data, it is included
in our analysis of market-wide learning.
2that drives the better selection of borrower risk over time is private, although newer cohorts of
lenders do appear more aware of borrower risk than older cohorts. When we divide a cohort
of lenders according to whether the performance of their initial portfolio is above or below the
market median, we ﬁnd that the below-median lenders learn faster, become more similar to the
above-median group in terms of loan selection, and close the gap between the two groups after
roughly 15 months on Prosper. We rule out mean reversion as the main explanation, thus this
ﬁnding supports the argument that lenders are heterogeneous in information processing and
such heterogeneity gradually declines over time as the less-informed parties learn more about
the market-wide risk.
The above-mentioned learning has signiﬁcant implications for both online and oﬄine markets.
As lenders realize the actual risk on the Internet, the P2P market has excluded more and more
subprime borrowers and evolved towards the population served by traditional credit markets.
This suggests that, unless P2P lenders can ﬁnd innovative tools to select “diamonds in the
rough,” P2P lending is likely to compete head-to-head with traditional banks in the future and
would not provide a viable alternative for those excluded from traditional credit markets.
Our work contributes to a number of literatures. In addition to the learning literature men-
tioned above, a large literature views information asymmetry as a source of market failure and
argues that the information asymmetry can be alleviated by reputation, third-party certiﬁca-
tion, or collateral (Akerlof 1970, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, and their follow-ups). We add learning
by doing to this list. Unlike previous studies that document the segmentation between online
and oﬄine markets (Jin and Kato 2007, Hendel, Nevo and Ortalo-Magne 2009), we show that
Prosper is converging with the traditional market. Our work is also complementary to a growing
literature on Prosper.com (Ravina 2007, Pope and Sydnor forthcoming, Iyer et al. 2009, Rigbi
2008, Hampshire 2008, Freedman and Jin 2008, Lin et al. 2009), which focuses on the relation-
ship between borrower attributes (such as race, gender, age, beauty, credit score, interest rate
caps, social network aﬃliation) and listing outcomes (funded or not, interest rate and default).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background of Pros-
per.com and its major competitors in traditional lending. Section 3 describes the data, deﬁnes
the sample, and summarizes the nature of information asymmetry for Prosper lenders. Section
4 presents basic evidence on how individual lenders learn to cope with the information problem
over time. Section 5 quantiﬁes part of the learning by analyizing internal rate of return. Section
6 explores lender heterogeneity in learning and Section 7 sheds light on the market implications
of learning by doing. A short conclusion is oﬀered in Section 8.
32 Background
2.1 Market Setup
All Prosper loans are ﬁxed rate, unsecured, three-years in duration, and fully amortized with
simple interest. Loan can range from $1,000 to $25,000. There is no penalty for early payment.
As of the end of our sample period (July 31, 2008), the loans are not tradable in any ﬁnancial
market,7 which means a lender that funds a loan is tied up with the loan until full payment or
default. Upon default Prosper hires collection agencies and any money retrieved in collections
is returned to the loan’s lenders.
Before a potential borrower lists a loan application, Prosper authenticates the applicant’s
social security number, driver’s license, and address. Prosper also pulls the borrower’s credit his-
tory from Experian, which includes the borrower’s credit score and historical credit information
such as total number of delinquencies, current delinquencies, inquiries in the last six months,
etc.8 If the credit score falls into an allowable range, the borrower may post an eBay-style listing
specifying the maximum interest rate she is willing to pay, the requested loan amount, the du-
ration of the auction (3-10 days),9 and whether she wants to close the listing immediately after
it is fully funded (called autofunding). In the listing, the borrower may also describe herself,
the purpose of the loan, the city of residence, how she intends to repay the loan, and any other
information (including an image) that she feels may help fund the loan. In the same listing,
Prosper will post the borrower’s credit grade (computed based on credit score), home ownership
status, debt-to-income ratio, and other credit history information.10
Like borrowers, a potential lender must provide a social security number and bank infor-
mation for identity conﬁrmation. Lenders can browse listing pages which include all of the
information described above, plus information about bids placed, the percent funded, and the
listing’s current prevailing interest rate. To view historical market data, a lender can download
a snapshot of all past Prosper records from Prosper.com (updated daily), use a Prosper tool
to query desired statistics, or visit a third party website that summarizes the data. Interviews
conducted at the 2008 Prosper Days Conference suggest that there is enormous heterogeneity
in lender awareness of the data, ability to process the data, and intent to track the data over
time.
7In October 2008, Prosper began the process of registering with the SEC in order to oﬀer a secondary market,
which was approved in July 2009 and therefore is outside of our sample period.
8The credit score reported uses the Experian ScorePLUS model, which is diﬀerent from a FICO score, because
it intends to better predict risks for new accounts.
9As of April 15, 2008 all listings have a duration of 7 days.
10The debt information is available from the credit bureau, but income is self-reported.
4The auction process is similar to proxy bidding on eBay. A lender bids on a listing by
specifying the lowest interest rate he will accept (so long as it is below the borrower’s speciﬁed
maximum rate) and the amount of dollars he would like to contribute (any amount above $5011).
A listing is fully funded if the total amount bid exceeds the borrower’s request. If the borrower
chooses autofunding, the auction will end immediately and the borrower’s maximum interest rate
applies. Otherwise, the listing remains open and new bids will compete down the interest rate.
Lenders with the lowest speciﬁed minimum interest rate will fund the loan and the prevailing
rate is set as the minimum interest rate speciﬁed by the ﬁrst lender excluded from funding the
loan. We will refer to the resulting interest rate as the contract rate.
Prosper charges fees to both borrowers and lenders. These fees have changed over time,
but in general borrowers pay a closing fee when their loan originates ranging from 1% to 3%
depending on credit grade (there is no fee for posting a listing). If a borrower’s monthly payment
is 15 days late, a late fee is charged and transferred to lenders in the full amount. Lenders are
charged an annual servicing fee based on the current outstanding loan principal.12 The lender
fee has ranged from 0.5% to 1% depending on credit grade. Prior to April 15, 2008, Prosper
was subject to state usury laws which specify the maximum interest rate a lender can charge.
The interest rate caps varied from 6% to 36% depending on the borrower’s state of residence.
On April 15, 2008, Prosper became a partner of WebBank, which allows the site to circumvent
most state usury laws. Following this partnership, the interest rate cap became a universal 36%
(except for Texas and South Dakota).
Prosper has continually changed the information that it provides lenders. At the beginning
of our sample (June 2006), the credit information posted on Prosper includes debt-to-income
ratio, credit grade, whether the borrower owns a home and some credit history information
about delinquencies, credit lines, public records, and credit inquires. Throughout our sample
time, credit grades are reported in categories, where grade AA is deﬁned as 760 or above, A as
720-759, B as 680-719, C as 640-679, D as 600-639, E as 540-599, HR as less than 540, and NC if
no credit score is available.13 The actual numerical credit score is not available to lenders partly
because of privacy protection for borrowers,14 and partly because Prosper has promised to not
reveal the numerical credit score in exchange for a deep discount on credit reports from Experian.
On February 12, 2007, Prosper began posting more detailed credit information plus self reported
income, employment and occupation.15 Additionally, Prosper tightened the deﬁnition of grade
11After Prosper registered with SEC in July 2009, the minimum bid was reduced to $25.
12This fee is accrued the same way that regular interest is accrued on the loan.
13Prosper has reﬁned credit grade deﬁnitions since its registration with the SEC in July 2009.
14If a borrower volunteers personal-identiﬁable information in the listing, Prosper personnel will remove such
information before posting the listing.
15On this date, lenders were also allowed to begin asking borrowers questions and the borrowers had the option
5E from 540-599 to 560-599 and grade HR from less than 540 to 520-559 eliminating borrowers
that have no score or a score below 520. On October 30, 2007, Prosper began to display a
Prosper-estimated rate of return on the bidding page (bidder guidance). Before this change,
a lender had to visit a separate page to look for the historical performance of similar loans.16
These information changes are likely to impact lender selection of loan risks on Prosper.
As detailed in a companion paper (Freedman and Jin 2008), Prosper also facilitates social
networking through groups and friends. A non-borrowing individual may set up a group as a
group leader, recruit new borrowers or lenders into the group (with a $12 reward when a group
member has a loan funded), but has no legal responsibility for the payment of any group loan. A
potential imbalance between member recruiting and performance monitoring prompted Prosper
to discontinue the group leader reward on September 12, 2007. Starting February 12, 2007,
Prosper members were allowed to invite oﬄine friends to join the website. The inviting friend
receives a reward when the new member funds ($25) or borrows her ﬁrst loan ($50).17 Group
leaders, group members and friends can all provide endorsements on a related listing and their
bids are highlighted on the listing page.
2.2 Oﬄine Competitors and Macro environment
The main competitors that Prosper faces in the traditional market are credit card debt
and unsecured personal loans.18 In our sample period (June 1, 2006 to July 31, 2008), 36%
of Prosper listings have mentioned credit card consolidation, which is higher than the mention
of business (23%), mortgage (14%), education (21%), and family purposes (18%) such as wed-
dings.19 Roughly 6% of Prosper listings mentions that the Prosper loan, if funded, will be used
to pay oﬀ payday loans in the oﬄine market.20
to post the Q&A on the listing page.
16Prosper also introduced portfolio plans on October 30, 2007, which allow lenders to specify a criterion regard-
ing what types of listings they would like to fund and Prosper will place their bids automatically. These portfolio
plans simpliﬁed the previously existing standing orders.
17Existing Prosper members can become friends as well if they know each other’s email address, but the
monetary reward does not apply.
18According to Federal Reserve G.19 Statistical Release as of April 7, 2008, the total consumer outstanding
(excluding mortgages) was valued at $2.54 trillion in February 2008. Within this category, $0.95 trillion was
revolving debts primarily borrowed in the form of credit cards. The rest ($1.58 trillion) were non-revolving debts
including loans for cars, mobile homes, education, boats, trailers, vacations, etc.
1969% of listings mention cars, but this at least partially a result of borrowers listing their car payments as a
monthly expense.
20Compared to the APR of 528% that Caskey(2005) reports for payday loans, one may argue Prosper could
provide a much better alternative to payday loans, given the 3-year duration of Prosper loans and the interest
rate cap no higher than 36%. However, lenders must consider the credit risk they face on Prosper. If a payday
lender must charge an annual interest rate of 500% to survive competition (Skiba and Tobachman 2007), it is
6As shown in Appendix Figure 1, consumer lending has undergone dramatic changes during
our sample period, ranging from a calm market with stable monetary policy before August
2007 to the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis on August 9, 2007 and gradual spillovers
to other types of lending and investment. In light of this, our analysis controls for a number
of daily macroeconomic variables, including the bank prime rate,21 the TED spread,22 the
yield diﬀerence between corporate bonds rated AAA and BAA, and S&P 500 closing quotes.
According to Greenlaw et al. (2008), the middle two are the strongest indicators of the subprime
mortgage crisis. Additionally, we include the unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) by state and month, the housing price index reported by the Oﬃce of
Federal Housing and Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) by state and quarter, and the quarterly
percentage of senior loan oﬃcers that have eased or tightened credit standards for consumer
loans, and the foreclosure rate reported by Realtytrac.com by state and month.
We also control for a number of daily Prosper-speciﬁc market characteristics, including the
total value of active loan requests by credit grade, the total dollar amount of submitted bids
by credit grade, and the percentage of funded loans that have ever been late by credit grade.
Because the ﬁnancial turmoil observed in the macro environment is rooted in the subprime
mortgage crisis, we control for the interaction of the OFHEO foreclosure rate and the borrower’s
home owner status and consumer loan easing and tightening with whether the borrower has a
credit grade of E or HR. Most of the time-series variables, except for those speciﬁc to date, state
or credit grade, will be absorbed in year-week ﬁxed eﬀects. Whenever possible, we estimate
speciﬁcations with and without these ﬁxed eﬀects for robustness.
3 Data Description and Evidence of Information Problems
In addition to the macroeconomic indicators described above, we download two Prosper
snapshots: one on August 1, 2008 and one on March 1, 2010. The 2008 snapshot provides
information on all listings and loans that have appeared on Prosper through July 31, 2008. We
choose this cutoﬀ because in October 2008 Prosper started a SEC review and stopped all new
listings. When it reopened in July 2009, a number of policies and market features had changed,
which makes the post-July 2009 period not comparable to the previous period. However, Prosper
continued to service ongoing loans during the review period, hence the Prosper snapshot from
March 1, 2010 tracks all loan performance up through February 21, 2010.
For each listing created between June 1, 2006 and July 31, 2008, we observe all of the
credit variables posted on the listing from Experian credit reports, the description and image
unclear why Prosper lenders would be willing to support this pool of borrowers with a much lower interest rate.
21Bank prime rate tracks the Fed funds rate with a 0.99 correlation.
22Deﬁned as the diﬀerence between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bills.
7information that the borrower posts, and a list of auction parameters chosen by the borrower.
For those listings that become loans, we observe the full payment history through February 21,
2010. For each Prosper member we observe their group aﬃliation and network of friends.23
Finally, data on all Prosper bids allow us to construct each lender’s portfolio on any given day.
The average lender funds 36 loans worth a total of $3,345 over his lifetime on Prosper, while the
median lender funds 12 loans worth a total of $850.
Excluding the few loans that were suspects of identity theft and as a result repurchased by
Prosper, Table 1 summarizes listings and loans by quarter from June 1, 2006 through July 31,
2008. This sample includes 293,808 listings and 25,008 loans for $158.27 million. This implies an
average funding rate of 8.51%, though this has varied over time ranging from 6.32% to 10.14%.
Average listing size and average loan size both increased through the ﬁrst half of 2007 and
have decreased since. Comparing listings and loans, the average listing requests $7,592 and the
average loan is worth $6,329. It appears that lenders are wary of listings requesting larger loans
and view this as a signal of higher risk. The average listing lists a maximum borrower rate of
19.19% while the average contract rate is 17.90%.24 This is much higher than the average interest
rate for credit card accounts (13.71%).25 or bank-issued unsecured personal loans (11.40%) as
reported by the Federal Reserve as of February 2008.
Table 2 presents the funding rate, interest rate, the percent late, the percent default, and
the percent 3-months late or worse (as of February 21, 2010) by the 8 credit grades observable
to Prosper lenders. We deﬁne a loan as in “default” if it is four or more months late or labeled
default by Prosper due to bankruptcy. As expected, a better grade means a higher funding rate,
lower interest rate, and better loan performance. The last three columns attempt to compare
Prosper loan performance to all the Experian accounts that had a new credit line approved in
September 2003. Since the performance of Experian accounts are observed as of September 2005,
we summarize the observed 2-year performance for Prosper loans for comparison. While the time
horizon of Prosper and Experian loans are not exactly the same, it is clear that Prosper loans
perform much worse than the traditional Experian accounts, even after we restrict the sample
to borrowers with debt to income ratio less than 20% (thus more comparable to borrowers that
can borrow on the traditional market). While part of the stark diﬀerence can be driven by an
unexpected ﬁnancial crisis and subsequent recession,26 it also suggests that the Prosper market
23The data dump reﬂects information about groups and friends as of the download date. Because these char-
acteristics can change over time, we use monthly downloads beginning in January 2007 to identify these charac-
teristics at the closest possible date to the actual listing.
24The sharp increase in borrower maximum rates between the ﬁrst and second quarters of 2008 reﬂects the
April 2008 removal of state speciﬁc interest rate caps.
25Conditional on the accounts that have been assessed interest.
26According to the Federal Reserve, the credit card charge-oﬀ rate has increased from 4.3% in the third quarter
8involves a large amount of unknown risk.
The ordinal diﬀerence in performance across grades remains salient after we run three de-
scriptive regressions that correlate observable listing attributes to the probability of being funded
(1funded), the interest rate if funded (InterestRate), and whether the loan is default or late as
of February 21, 2010 (1defaultorlate). If a certain listing attribute (say credit grade) is a well-
understood indicator of credit risk, we should see a greater funding probability, a lower interest
rate, and better ex-post performance for listings of higher grades. The regression equations are
as follows:
1funded,i = f1(ListingAttributesi,macro,FEyw) + e1it (1)
ContractRatei = f2(ListingAttributesi,macro,FEyw) + e2it (2)
1defaultorlate,it = f3(ListingAttributes,macroFEyw,FEa) + e3it (3)
All three regressions include year-week ﬁxed eﬀects (FEyw) to control for the changing environ-
ment on and oﬀ Prosper. Equation (3) also includes a full set of monthly loan age dummies (FEa)
to control for the life cycle of loan performance. ListingAttributes include Experian-veriﬁed
credit history information, borrower-speciﬁed loan terms (e.g. amount request and maximum
interest rate), borrower self-reported information (e.g. loan purpose, image, description) and
social network variables (e.g. whether the borrower belongs to a Prosper group, whether the
listing is endorsed and/or bid on by group leaders and friends). Summary statistics of these
attributes can be found in Apendix Table 1. The funding rate and performance regressions are
estimated by probits and the interest rate regression is estimated by OLS.
According to Table 3, the probability of being default or late increases by credit grade, and in
response, interest rate increases and the funding probability decreases. This suggests that credit
grade is an important measure of borrower risk and lenders understand these ordinal diﬀerences.
Similarly, lenders understand that the more a borrower requests to borrow, the higher the risk
of mis-performance, and therefore the funding rate decreases and the interest rate increases with
loan size.27 Lenders also foresee the higher risk of autofunded loans and adjust funding rate and
interest rate accordingly.
In contrast, the consistency between funding rate, interest rate and loan performance fails
to hold for some of the self-reported attributes. For instance, revealing a re-listing increases the
funding rate but shows no diﬀerence in interest rate or ex post performance. Similar inconsis-
tencies appear in social network variables such as group, group leader endorsement, and friend
endorsement without bid. In contrast, mentioning education in a listing description implies
of 2005 to 5.5% in the second quarter of 2008.
27Loan size is a typical method of credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
9equal funding rate, equal interest rate but signiﬁcantly lower probability of default or late. We
take these regressions as evidence that, on average, Prosper lenders do not always predict the
correct relationship between some observable characteristics and loan performance.
One explanation for why Prosper loans tend to perform worse than the Experian accounts
within each credit grade is that Prosper attracts more borrowers towards the lower end of each
grade (adverse selection). To detect this, we obtain from Prosper a private data set that includes
the number of listings, number of loans, average contract interest rate, percent late at 6 months,
and percent late at 12 months by state, month, and “half grade.” Except for the two ends of
the score distribution, half grades are deﬁned as a 20-point interval of credit scores, for instance,
600-619 (referred to as D-) and 620-639 (D+). In total, we have 20 half grades, which is much
more detailed than the 8 credit grades posted on Prosper.com during our sample period.28 For
comparison, this data set also includes Experian data on historical loan performance in these
ﬁner credit intervals for oﬄine consumer loans. All half grade performance statistics are observed
as of August 1, 2008.
Figure 1A compares the c.d.f. of Prosper listings, Prosper loans, the Experian population,
and Experian new accounts across the 20 half grades. By Experian population, we mean all
the accounts that have a score by the Experian ScorexPLUS model in December 2003.29 As a
person may have a record in Experian without demanding credit, the Experian population is
an imperfect comparison for Prosper listings. The Experian new accounts are deﬁned as above,
where the credit could be secured (such as a mortgage) or unsecured (such as a credit card).
Even though the Prosper vs. Experian comparison is imperfect,30 there is no doubt that Prosper
listings have a much greater concentration in lower credit intervals. Prosper lenders are able
to select better risks from the listing pool, but the overall distribution of Prosper loans is still
worse than that of Experian accounts.
Figures 1B and 1C present the p.d.f. of Prosper listings and Prosper loans by the 20 half
grades and across time. The loan distribution is also compared with the p.d.f. of Experian new
accounts as deﬁned above. Not surprisingly, Prosper attracts listings towards the lowest end
of the credit score distribution (Figure 1B) while the traditional lenders tend to focus on the
highest end (Figure 1C), probably because traditional lenders cannot satisfy the credit demand
28The precise deﬁnitions of the 20 half grades are 300-479, 480-499, 500-519, 520-539 (HR-), 540-559 (HR+),
560-579 (E-), 580-599 (E+), 600-619 (D-), 620-639 (D+), 640-659 (C-), 660-679 (C+), 680-699 (B-), 700-719
(B+), 720-739 (A-), 740-759 (A+), 760-779 (AA-), 780-799 (AA+), 800-819, 820-839, 840-900.
29“Redeveloped Experian/Fair, Issac Risk Model” (December 2003) accessed at
www.chasecredit.com/news/expﬁcov2.pdf on September 5, 2008.
30Given the stability of credit markets before the subprime crisis and the credit crunch after August 2007, the
Experian distribution is likely to overestimate the traditional credit access in 2006-2008 and therefore constitutes
a conservative comparison group against Prosper.
10of near or subprime risk and therefore these risks ﬁnd Prosper an attractive alternative. More
interestingly, the Prosper loan distribution is much less smooth than the Experian new accounts.
From Figure 1C we see a higher concentration at D- than D+, C- than C+, etc. in the Prosper
loans, but not in the Experian accounts. This is consistent with adverse selection towards minus
grades. Also note that this pattern does not disappear over time, though the listing and loan
distributions are both moving towards the right, which could be due to the credit crunch forcing
near prime and prime risks to seek credit on Prosper, Prosper revealing more information hence
discouraging subprime risks, or Prosper lenders learning to avoid subprime risks.
To further explore the systematic diﬀerence between minus and plus grades, we examine the
population of Prosper listings and loans by half-grade (i), census division (c) and month (t)31
Table 4 reports a set of regressions that evaluate the impact of minus grade on (1) the number of
Prosper listings, (2) the number of Prosper loans, (3) the funding rate,32 (4) the average interest
rate of loans, (5) the percent late after 6 months, and (6) the percent late after 12 months, while
controlling for year-month ﬁxed eﬀects ( t), credit grade ﬁxed eﬀects ( grade, i.e. one dummy
for AA, one for A, etc.), and census division ﬁxed eﬀects ( c). Denoting dependent variables
as Y , this amounts to the following regression equation in which the coeﬃcient on the dummy
of minus grade, β, tells us how minus grades diﬀer from plus grades within the same grade.33
Standard errors are clustered by census division.
(4) Yict = 1minusgrade · β +  c +  t +  grade + ǫict
Table 4 shows evidence of adverse selection consistent with the raw data: compared to plus
grades, minus grades have on average 11 more listings and 2 more loans per division-grade-
month. Both numbers imply a signiﬁcant concentration towards minus grades as there are only
30 listings and 6 loans in each cell on average. As expected, the minus grade loans perform
signiﬁcantly worse. The fact that Prosper lenders do not observe credit scores explains why the
funding rate is no diﬀerent between minus and plus grades. However conditional on funding,
lenders do charge 0.4 percentage point higher interest rates on the minus grades, which suggests
that they may make some inferences as to which loans are minus grades and which are not based
on other listing attribute. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in Iyer et al. (2009). However,
since 93.47% (95.05%) of loans that are late by the 6th (12th) month will eventually default,
31We have state level data but some states have too few observations in the count of listings or loans. Aggregation
into census division alleviates this problem. We have also tried aggregation into census regions, and results are
similar.
32Which is literally the number of loans divided by the number of listings in each cell.
33Because the February 2007 Prosper policy disallowed any listing with credit score below 520, to facilitate
comparison the regression sample excludes credit scores below 520. Results using all the “half-grade” intervals
are very similar to the presented results except for the coeﬃcient on the HR dummy.
11the 0.4 percentage point higher interest rates is hardly enough to compensate the increased
risk of minus grades as shown in the last two columns of Table 4 where minus grade loans
are 1.4 percentage points and 2.3 percentage points more likely to be late in 6 or 12 months,
respectively. The same speciﬁcation on the counts of Experian new accounts by half grade ﬁnds
a close-to-zero coeﬃcient for the minus grade dummy (t=0.25).34
Overall, this data summary suggests that Prosper lenders understand the ordinal diﬀerences
across credit grades, but some listing attributes are related to better funding rates and better
interest rates without better loan performance or vice versa. Moreover, the crude deﬁnition
of credit grade may have resulted in adverse selection towards minus grades. These ﬁndings
suggest that Prosper lenders face signiﬁcant information problems. Whether and to what extent
they can overcome these problems via learning is an empirical question we will address next.
4 Basic Evidence of Lender Learning
Strictly speaking, lenders may learn from not only their own experience but also market-
wide performance. As a start, we focus on the former because it is diﬃcult to disentangle
market-wide performance from other unobservable time series that aﬀect the Prosper market at
the same time. In this sense, the evidence documented below describes the extra learning that
lenders obtain from their own experience in addition to their learning from the overall market.
We will revisit market-wide learning later when we compare diﬀerent lender cohorts.
We estimate a series of regressions describing how lender i’s choices to fund, amount to fund,
and type of loans to fund in week t respond to characteristics and performance of the lender’s
portfolio up through week t − 1:
(5) FundedALoanit = g1(PortCharit−1,PortLateit−1) + a1it +  1i + γ1t + ǫ1it
(6) AmountFundedit = g2(PortCharit−1,PortLateit−1) + a2it +  2i + γ2t + ǫ2it
PortCompit = g3(PortCharit−1,AtoAALateit−1,BtoDLateit−1,EtoHRLateit−1,
NCLateit−1) + a3it +  3i + γ3t + ǫ3it
(7)
The ﬁrst equation is a linear probability model of an indicator that a lender funded at least one
loan in a given week.35 The other two equations only include the sample of lenders who funded
at least one loan in week t. In Equation 6, AmountFundedit is the dollar amount invested
by an active lender in week t. Equation 7 is run separately for various PortCompit variables,
34These ﬁndings are all robust to controlling for a polynomial function of the mid-point of each credit interval.
35Because we will use a large number of ﬁxed eﬀects, we choose a linear probability model over a probit model
for this set of regressions,
12which specify the percentage of an active lender’s investment in AA to A, B to D, or E to
HR loans in week t. PortCharit−1 includes lender i’s portfolio HHI and portfolio size through
the previous week to control for time varying lender characteristics. PortLateit−1 reﬂects the
percentage of lender i’s portfolio that has ever been late as of the previous week. AtoAALateit−1,
BtoDLateit−1, EtoHRLateit−1 are the percentage of lender i’s portfolio through the previous
week that has ever been late in each of the three respective credit grade categories.36
All regressions include lender, week, and lender age ﬁxed eﬀects, with standard errors clus-
tered by lender. With lender ﬁxed eﬀects ( ji) the coeﬃcients on the ever late variables are
identiﬁed by within lender changes in portfolio performance and investment decisions. Note,
these regressions reﬂect how lenders respond to both late and on-time performance because on-
time payment (or early payoﬀ) is by deﬁnition the opposite of default or late. Year-week ﬁxed
eﬀects (γjt) controls for changes in the macroeconomic environment and the Prosper market.37
Monthly lender age ﬁxed eﬀects (ajit)38 capture any general pattern in lenders’ choices as they
age.
The results of regressions (5)-(7) are reported in Table 5. Lenders show strong responses
to poorly performing loans in their portfolios. On average, a ten percentage point increase in
the proportion of their portfolio that has ever been late decreases their probability of funding a
loan by 0.78 percentage points in Column 1 and decreases the amount they invest in an active
week by $79.5 in Column 3. Columns 2 and 4 show that these two outcomes are sensitive to
late loans in all credit grades.
One may argue that there is a mechanical relationship between portfolio performance and
new investment because bad past performance implies less money available for new investments.
However, this would not explain why a lender changes his portfolio composition in response
to past performance. Columns 5-7 display the coeﬃcients from the diﬀerent versions of the
PortComp regressions. As lenders observe late loans, they tend to decrease their funding of
loans in the grade with the adverse shock and increase their funding of higher quality grades.39
We take these results as evidence of learning. The high late and default rates of E and HR
loans have driven lenders away from these loans and toward higher credit grades as lenders have
learned about the dangers of investing in these lower credit grades. It is possible that a lender
36We have also tried speciﬁcations using the percent of a lender’s portfolio (in total or in various categories)
that is currently late or in default and the results are very similar.
37Results of identical regressions with controls for macro variables and Prosper supply, demand, and market
performance instead of week ﬁxed eﬀects are very similar.
38We count a lender as joining Prosper when he funds his ﬁrst loan, and age is deﬁned as weeks since joining
Prosper.
39Note that when lenders observe late AA to A loans, they do show slight substitution towards the lower credit
grade loans.
13with less wealth becomes more risk averse and therefore invests in safer credit grades. This is
unlikely the driving force, because the amount a typical lender invests on Prosper ($850 at the
median) is small as compared to the median household income in the US ($52,175 according to
the 2006-2008 American Community Survey).
In results not shown here, we observe similar learning patterns when we use regressions to
describe the propensity to fund loans in other categories (including autofunded loans, loans of
various sizes, and loans aﬃliated with speciﬁc types of social networks) as a function of late loans
in these categories. These results suggest that in this new market, lenders attempt to learn the
meaning of many listing attributes, even though some of them have been well understood in
traditional oﬀ line markets.
Above all, we ﬁnd evidence that lenders learn from their own portofolio performance on two
margins: on the extensive margin, a greater percentage of default or late existing loans triggers
less new investment; on the intensive margin, conditional on funding new loans, a lender tends to
avoid the listing attributes that led to bad performance in his portofolio and prefer the attributes
that led to good performance. Given the large number of listing attributes lenders observe, the
next section summarizes a lender’s loan choice through one number – internal rate of return
(IRR).
5 Measuring the Extent of Learning with IRR
We compute the internal rate of return (IRR) that a sophisticated lender should expect from
a Prosper loan as he considers all of the information at the time of the listing and projects
loan performance throughout the 36-month loan life. If a lender initially underestimates the
risk of a loan with certain attributes (say grade HR) but later learns to either charge a higher
contract rate on a similar loan or fund a better-grade loan, this process can be summarized as
the IRR improvement from old to new loans. We emphasize that our goal in calculating IRR
is not to quantify the absolute level of performance of Prosper loans, but instead to obtain a
summary measure that ranks loans by the relationship between their observable characteristics
and performance taking interest rate into account.40
To calculate IRR, we ﬁrst use the observed ex post loan performance to predict a relationship
between listing attributes and loan performance, and then calculate an annual discount factor
(call it R) that equalizes the loan amount to the present value of all the predicted monthly cash
inﬂows. Compounding R monthly, IRR = (1+R/12)12 −1 reﬂects the annual percentage yield
40In ﬁnance, a popular measure of asset risk β is the correlation of its return with that of the ﬁnancial market
as a whole. It is impossible to compute β per loan because Prosper loans were not traded after origination in our
sample period.
14from the loan. We believe this method captures the rate of return that a sophisticated lender
expects to earn at the start of the loan if he can perfectly predict the statistical distribution of
loan performance.
We use four dummies to measure loan performance: default, default or late, missed payment,
and early pay oﬀ. Located between the most optimistic (default) and the most pessimistic
(default or late), the dummy of missed payment is deﬁned as one if the loan’s payment history
indicates that the borrower has missed the payment in a speciﬁc month. If the borrower misses
the payment at month t but makes it up in a later month, we count it as not missing the payment.
Early pay oﬀ is treated as a bulk of cash ﬂow in the actual month of payment and zero afterwards.
This implicitly assumes that the early payoﬀ is reinvested into a loan that is identical to the loan
under study.41 While in reality the payment history can be very complicated, we simplify the
predicted cash inﬂow for loan i at month m as the sum of (1) the probability of early pay oﬀ at
m times the principal remaining plus interest at m and (2) the probability of on-time payment at
m times the monthly payment, net of the lender fee. Monthly payment and principal remaining
are computed according to the 3-year amortization table, and probability of on-time payment is
computed as one minus the probability of mis-performance and the probability of having paid
oﬀ before or at month m.
Before we use loan attributes to predict loan performance, it is worth noting that the macroe-
conomic environment has changed substantially due to the worldwide ﬁnancial crisis that even
the most sophisticated loan oﬃcer may not have anticipated. If we do not isolate macroeco-
nomic changes from the realized loan performance, we may mistakenly attribute lender adjust-
ment in response to the unexpected macroeconomic shock as a form of learning that overcomes
lender misunderstanding of borrower attribute. To address this problem, we include the realized
macroeconomic variables on the right hand side when we predict loan performance. Denoting
Perfit as the performance of loan i at calendar month t, gradei as i’s credit grade, Xi as other
loan attributes, αm as loan age ﬁxed eﬀects (by month) and realmacrot as the realized macroe-
conomic environment, we estimate the below speciﬁcation by probit. We choose probit over a
duration model because probit allows an event (such as missed payment) to switch on and oﬀ
over time, and because probit yields fewer prediction errors as compared to a duration model.
The Appendix reports results using a duration model and an alternative probit speciﬁcation.
(8) Perfit = αm + β1 · gradei + β2 · Xi + β3 · realmacrot + β4 · gradei · realmacrot + ǫit
41The assumption could lead to an over- or under-estimate for the return on investment in a given period. One
way to overcome this problem is assuming the reinvestment rate equal to a speciﬁc average cost of capital. Here
we do not use modiﬁed IRR, partly because any choice of the reinvestment rate is arbitrary, and partly because
this study is not meant to be an investment guide. We emphasize performance comparison across loans, not
whether Prosper loans are ﬁnancially worth investing in a ﬁxed time period.
15A subsequent problem arises in prediction: if lenders did not anticipate the realized macroe-
conomic shock, what kind of macroeconomic environment did they anticipate? How can we
separate the change in lenders’ macroeconomic anticipation from the change of their fundamen-
tal understanding of borrower attributes? To address these questions, we construct two series of
macroeconomic forecasts: one is the quarterly forecast that a lender would have forecast as of
June 1, 2006 (the beginning of our sample) given all of the macroeconomic information available
then. We make this forecast by ﬁtting a vector autoregressive model from 1997 through the
second quarter of 2006.42 Denote this forecast as ˆ macro
6/1/06
m for loan age m. By construction,
it is not updated for later loans as more macro information accumulates over time. In contrast,
in the other macro forecast – denoted as ˆ macro
rolling
im – we make the forecast on a rolling basis
so that a loan (i) funded at calendar month m corresponds to the quarterly forecast that a
lender would have made given the available macroeconomic information from 1997 through that
quarter. With parameter estimates from the above probit speciﬁcation (which utilize the actual
realized macroeconomic variables in estimation), we have two versions of predicted performance
for a loan at age m = 1,...36:
ˆ Perf
6/1/06
im = ˆ αm + ˆ β1 · gradei + ˆ β2 · Xi + ˆ β3 · ˆ macro6/1/06




im = ˆ αm + ˆ β1 · gradei + ˆ β2 · Xi + ˆ β3 · ˆ macro
rolling
im + ˆ β4 · gradei · ˆ macro
rolling
im (10)
The rolling forecast better captures the lender’s prediction at the time of funding, but an IRR
change in a lender’s portfolio (based on ˆ macrorolling) reﬂects both the changes in the rolling
forecast and the changes in borrower attributes between new and old loans. In comparison, ﬁxing
the macro forecast as of June 1, 2006, changes in the IRR estimate (based on ˆ macro6/1/06) will
only reﬂect changes in loan attributes, which we interpret as a change in lender’s understanding
of loan characteristics independent of macroeconomic shocks.
For comparison, we also construct IRRnomacro based on a probit speciﬁcation that excludes
all the macroeconomic variables, and IRRrealmacro based on the same probit as above but using
the realized macroeconomic environment as the prediction. IRRnomacro assumes a sophisticated
lender has perfect foresight on the realized distribution of loan performance and attributes all
of it to loan attributes. In comparison, IRRrealmacro assumes a sophisticated lender has per-
fect foresight on both the macroeconomic shocks and loan performance distribution separately.
Since IRR calculation requires performance prediction from month 1 to month 36, we can only
estimate IRRrealmacro for loans that have matured as of February 21, 2010 while IRRnomacro,
IRRforecast6/01/06 and IRRrollingforecast can be estimated for all loans in our sample.
Table 6 summarizes 12 versions of IRR estimates depending on which misperformance mea-
42The model includes a two and four quarter lag and four quarter ﬁxed eﬀects to account for seasonality.
16sure we use and how we treat the macroeconomic forecast. In theory, the present value for-
mula is monotone and should have a unique solution of R that is bounded between -1200%
and the contract rate. After monthly compounding, IRR is bounded between -100% and
(1 + contract rate/12)12 − 1. In practice, we do achieve over 99% of convergence if we do
not impose any constraint on IRR. However, since we predict the likelihood of early payoﬀ and
misperformance separately,43 there is a small chance (less than 10%) that the sum of the es-
timated likelihood is over one in at least one of the 36 months, hence the converged IRR can
exceed the theoretical upper bounds. To address this issue, the IRRs reported in Table 6 are
estimated with the imposed constraint that they cannot lie outside their theoretical bounds. All
of the loan comparisons reported below are robust if we focus on the loans whose unconstrained
IRRs do not exceed the bound.
We present summary statistics of these IRR measures at three levels: the individual loan
level, the dollar level (weighting IRR by the dollar value of each loan), and the lender level
(averaging across lender portfolios). At all three levels – loan, lender or dollar – the comparison
of IRR1 to IRR12 (conditional on convergence) is consistent with expectation. For example,
using default as the misperformance measure yields higher IRRs than using missed payment or
default or late. The average IRR using missed payment is only slightly higher than that of default
or late, consistent with the fact that many borrowers that miss payments do not catch up later.
The IRR estimates using the realized macroeconomic variables are signiﬁcantly more negative
than other versions using macroeconomic forecasts, partly because the loans in the sample
using real macroeconomic values are early loans, and partly because the real macroeconomic
version unrealistically assumes lenders have perfect foresight on future macroeconomic shocks.
If we focus on the loans that matured before February 21, 2010, the average IRRrealmacro is
only slightly lower than the average IRRrollingforecast and IRRforecast6/1/06. This suggests that
unexpected macroeconomic shocks only explain a small fraction of IRRrealmacro.44
As shown in Figure 2, the average IRRrollingforecast is systematically higher than the aver-
age IRRforecast6/1/06 over time. This suggests that lenders become more optimistic about the
macroeconomic environment between June 2006 and July 2008. This is plausible because the
ﬁnancial crisis did not strike the wholesale ﬁnancial market until August 2007 and it was unclear
how soon this crisis would aﬀect the payment ability of Prosper borrowers. IRRrollingforecast
does decline after the beginning of 2008, as lenders became less optimistic after the crisis broke
out. As mentioned above, IRRforecast6/1/06 keeps the macroeconomic forecast ﬁxed at what
lenders would have predicted as of June 1, 2006, hence changes of IRRforecast6/1/06 only re-
43The joint estimation takes an extremely long time and does not yield stable results.
44Note that we can only compute IRRrealmacro for the earliest cohorts of loans but the macroeconomic shock
could have a bigger eﬀect on later cohorts.
17ﬂect changes in loan attributes. Because default tends to underestimate loan misperformance
and default or late overestimates it, we focus on IRR8, the IRRforecast6/1/06 that uses missed
payment as the misperformance measure.
According to Table 6, average IRR8 does not diﬀer much across loan (-4.13%), lender (-
3.75%) and dollar (-4.03%) levels, suggesting that big lenders and big loans do not earn signif-
icantly higher returns than small lenders or small loans. For comparison, the average annual
yields of 3-year Treasury Bill and S&P 500 are 3.97% and -0.66% in the same period (June 1, 2006
to July 31, 2008). While part of the low IRRforecast6/1/06 can be attributed to lenders expecting
better macroeconomic conditions than those of June 1, 2006, the average IRRrollingforecast per
loan (0.18%) is still lower than the return of treasury bills or savings account. While we do not
emphasize this absolute level, it appears that lenders may have systematically underestimated
borrower risk; it is also possible that lenders willingly lend on Prosper for charity or for fun.
Figure 3 presents the kernel density of loan-speciﬁc IRR8 by credit grade. Not surprisingly,
grades E-HR have the longest left tail and the lowest average IRR8 (-14.38%). Interestingly,
the average IRR8 of B-D loans (0.52%) is higher than that of AA-A (-2.39%), probably because
borrowers of B-D grades often specify higher maximum interest rates and lenders do not compete
down the interest rate of B-D as much as AA-A. Figure 4 plots how IRR8 changes over time by
grades, and interestingly the IRR8 within the E-HR category increases over time. This ﬁgure
and the above-mentioned learning evidence suggest that the marketwide improvement of IRR8
is driven by lenders switching towards better grades and picking better performing loans within
the E-HR category.
If lender mistakes are the main explanation for the low IRRs, lenders should learn to choose
better loans when they observe their previously funded loans perform poorly. To quantify
learning on such an intensive margin, we rerun the learning equation 5 but redeﬁne the dependent
variable as the average IRR8 of the loans that lender i funded in week t.
(11) AvgIRR8it = g1(PortCharit−1,PortLateit−1) + a1it +  1i + γ1t + ǫ1it
The regression results are reported in the last two columns of Table 5. The coeﬃcient in the
second to last column suggests that, when the average lender sees a ten percentage point in-
crease in the portion of his portfolio that has been late, his newly funded loans have a 1.98
percentage point higher IRR8. This is a large improvement: by the end of our sample period
(July 2008), 39.8% of the loans originated at the beginning of the sample (June 2006) are ei-
ther late or default. According to the regression, this performance alone would have motivated
a 7.88 percentage point improvement in IRR8, a magnitude that is comparable to the largest
marketwide improvement of IRR8 (6.51 percentage points) in our sample period. More speciﬁ-
cally, Figure 5 plots by loan origination month (1) the average IRR8 per loan, (2) the average
18contract rate, and (3) the predicted probability of missed payment in month 6. Over time, the
average IRR8 ﬁrst declines from -4.10% in June 2006 to -9.85% in November 2006 and then
gradually increases to -3.34% in July 2008. We suspect the initial decline of IRR8 is because
Prosper lenders underestimated the market risk, which therefore attracted a large ﬂow of high
risk borrowers to enter the market. As the risk unfolded, both lender learning and the more
transparent information from Prosper could have contributed to the IRR8 improvement after
November 2006. Interestingly, the marketwide IRR8 improvement is mostly driven by lower
missed payment rates rather than higher interest rates.
The result that lenders choose loans with higher IRR8 in response to past late loans in their
portfolios is consistent with the earlier result that lenders switch towards better credit grades
after they observe misperformance in their own portofolio. Additionally, the last column of
Table 5 shows that lenders choose loans of higher IRR8 in response to late loans in all four
credit grade categories. In addition to substituting between credit grades, lenders may choose
better performing loans within credit grades as they learn. To test this we regress the average
IRR8 of loans a lender funds in a given week within each credit grade on the percent late
variables across all grade groups deﬁned above. As shown in Appendix Table 2, the results
reveal that, except within the AA grade, lenders fund higher IRR8 loans within each credit
grade in response to past late loans, and this response is usually concentrated to late loans
within the corresponding coarse grade group. This suggests that lender learning is not limited
to switching from low credit grades to high credit grades (as shown in Table 5); they also learn
to better interpret other listing attributes within each credit grade.
Combining Sections 4 and 5, evidence suggests that lenders learn from their own mistakes
in two ways: when their existing loans perform poorly, they fund fewer new loans and the new
loans that they fund have observable attributes that predict a higher internal rates of return.
6 Heterogeneous Learning
The literature led by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argues that in a market with uncertainty
market eﬃciency depends on not only the degree of uncertainty but also on how diﬀerent traders
acquire or process information to address this uncertainty. It is clear that there is a great deal
of heterogeneity across lenders on Prosper. For example, lenders diﬀer greatly in the rate of
return of their portfolio: while the mean of per lender IRR8 is -3.75%, it ranges from -99.9%
to 32.9% with a standard deviation of 7.0%. If lenders diﬀer in their ability to screen loans
and their ability to learn from their mistakes, competition will not lead to equalized expected
returns across funded loans. In this section we document signiﬁcant gaps in lender ability and
how learning acts to close these gaps.
19In particular, we separate lenders into two groups based on their initial “sophistication.” We
ﬁrst calculate each lender’s average portfolio IRR8 for the loans chosen during their ﬁrst month
on Prosper and then label a lender “sophisticated” if his ﬁrst month portfolio IRR8 is above
his cohort’s median (lender cohort is deﬁned by the week in which a lender joined Prosper).45
Recall that our measure of IRR8 is based on the expected return associated with a given loan’s
observable characteristics. We split lenders by whether or not they choose loans with observable
characteristics that would predict good performance, not whether or not they choose loans that
result in good performance ex post.
As pointed out by Hotelling (1933), this type of classiﬁcation is subject to mean reversion.
To the extent that lenders misunderstand and/or ignore observable loan characteristics, some
lenders may choose good loans not by sophistication but by chance. To mitigate this concern,
Table 7 shows that above- and below-median lenders diﬀer systematically in their inital lending
strategies. At the end of their ﬁrst month on Prosper, above-median lenders have on average
smaller portfolios, composed of a slightly higher number of loans, and therefore a slightly lower
average loan size.46 More strikingly, these two groups have a much diﬀerent credit grade dis-
tribution with above-median lenders much more likely to choose AA-A and B-D loans at the
median and much less likely to invest in E-HR loans.
Additionally, if luck were driving the diﬀerences between the two groups (and assuming luck
is independent across time and lenders), we would expect, by the law of large numbers, the
average IRR8 of the two groups to converge immediately after the ﬁrst month. Figure 6 plots
the average new portfolio IRR8 by lender age (in weeks) for the two groups. There appears to
be some evidence of mean reversion as average IRR of the sophisticated group drops and the
average IRR of the unsophisticated group increases over the ﬁrst few weeks. However, after this
discrete change, a gap remains and then closes gradually. This pattern suggests that the initial
gap is not simply due to luck, and that the subsequent convergence is likely due to behavioral
changes over the lender’s life cycle. This gradual convergence is consistent with learning as the
below-median lenders respond to late loans in their portfolio and pick future loans with better
observable characteristics. The subsequent curves suggest that learning allows the below-median
type to catch up with the above-median type by roughly the 80th week (or the 20th month).
To further support learning as a likely explanation for the eventual convergence, we plot
45In all subsequent analysis that separates above- and below-median lenders, we condition the sample on cohorts
after June 1, 2006 to focus on lenders who joined Prosper during our sample period and because the earlier weekly
cohorts are quite small (74 lenders on average compared to 399 for later cohorts) making the above/below-median
split less reliable.
46These diﬀerences are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, although the medians are much more similar
across groups.
20how above- and below-median lenders diﬀer in the grade composition of newly funded loans
as a function of a lender’s Prosper age (Figure 7 for grades AA-A and Figure 8 for E-HR).
Consistent with the within-lender learning regressions, both above- and below-median types
increase investment in grades AA-A and decrease investment on E-HR as they age. However,
there is a signiﬁcant gap between the two types until the 80th week: before they converge,
above-median lenders always invest more in AA-A and less in E-HR. This suggests that both
the inital and subsequent rate of return gap between the two types of lenders as observed in
Figure 6 is most likely driven by systematic diﬀerence in loan choice instead of luck.
To formalize the above graphs in a regression framework, we ﬁrst deﬁne the unit of observa-
tion as lender i of cohort c in type p at age a, where cohort and age are both measured in months.
We then regress the average IRR8 of all loans funded by lender i, in group p at age a on cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects, age ﬁxed eﬀects, week ﬁxed eﬀects,47 a dummy indicating the “above-median” type
(1abovemedian) and interactions of 1abovemedian with a linear cohort term, a linear age term and a
separate dummy for the second month:
AverageIRR8icpa = cohort + γage + β1 · 1abovemedian + β2 · 1abovemedian · cohort
+ β3 · 1abovemedian · month2 + β4 · 1abovemedian · age
+ β5 · 1abovemedian · cohort · age + FEwk + ǫcga.
(12)
The coeﬃcient of 1abovemedian · age captures the gradual change in the gap between above- and
below-median types, while the coeﬃcient of 1abovemedian·month2 captures the initial shrinkage of
the gap due to potential mean reversion. As shown in Table 8, we ﬁnd β1 = 0.084, which indicates
that the ﬁrst-month portfolio of “above-median” lenders has an average IRR 8.4 percentage
points higher than the “below-median” lenders. The estimates of β2 (-0.001) and β4 (-0.004)
suggest that later cohorts are systematically more homogeneous and the IRR diﬀerence between
above- and below-median lenders declines steadily within each cohort as “below-median” lenders
learn. Interestingly, β4 is much larger than β2 in magnitude, suggesting that learning by doing
is more eﬀective in reducing lender heterogeneity within a cohort than factors that reduce
heterogeneity across cohorts, an observation we will return to in the next section. Additionally,
the estimate of β3 (-0.026) suggests that mean reversion explains at most 31% of the initial
IRR8 diﬀerence between above- and below-median lenders. Taken together, these results suggest
signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the initial level of lender sophistication. The estimate of β5 is very
small (-0.00018), suggesting that the relatively less sophisticated lenders in the later cohorts
learn almost as much as the earlier cohorts, even if they are more similar to the sophisticated
lenders when they started lending on Prosper. Table 8 also shows results of similar regressions
47Cohort, age and week can be simultaneously identiﬁed because cohort and age are by month instead of week.
Results barely change if we ignore week ﬁxed eﬀects.
21where the dependent variable is the fraction of the lender’s loans invested in diﬀerent credit grade
categories in a given week. Consistent with Figures 7 and 8, below-median lenders initially fund
more E to HR loans and less A to AA loans, but over time their portfolio composition becomes
more similar to above-median lenders.
Following Hotelling (1933), further evidence of these initial behavioral diﬀerences and sub-
sequent changes can be seen in Appendix Figures 10 and 11. These ﬁgures show that the across
lender variance in IRR8 decreases as lenders age, suggesting that the convergence of IRR8 is
due to lenders choosing more similar loans as they age. Furthermore, below-median lenders are
initally a much more heterogenious group with higher variance than the above-median lenders.
As they age, both groups become more homogenous, and the variance of below-median lenders
eventually converges with the above-median group.
7 Market-Wide Implications
To this point, we have presented evidence that (1) lenders actively respond to the perfor-
mance of their own portfolios on top of market-wide ﬂuctuation; (2) there is a large amount of
heterogeneity within each lender cohort, most of which is driven by relatively more sophisticated
lenders selecting loans with better observables; (3) over time, the less sophisticated lenders grad-
ually catch up with the sophisticated lenders in the same cohort, (4) later lender cohorts show
less heterogeneity than earlier cohorts, and (5) learning by doing is more eﬀective in reducing
lender heterogeneity within a cohort than factors that decrease heterogeneity across cohorts.
While these facts highlight the importance of learning by doing, it also raises more funda-
mental questions regarding lender information and the overall market evolution. For example,
do lenders’ responses to their own portfolio imply that they ignore market wide information?
Do some lenders over-react? Why are some lenders more sophisticated than others when they
join Prosper? Would lenders obtain better information by watching the market before lending
themselves? Taking the market as a whole, how does lender sophistication evolve over time and
what does it imply for market evolution? Some of these questions are diﬃcult to answer, but a
combination of existing and further evidence sheds some light on them.
7.1 Over-reaction?
In a model where price is the only observable market-wide statistic that aggregates private
information, there should be a negative relationship between price informativeness and sensitiv-
ity to private information. However, in our context, reaction to one’s own portfolio could reﬂect
many possibilities, including ignorance of market wide information (to be discussed in the next
subsection), noise in market-wide information, lender taste deviating from the market average,
22and over-reaction.
Empirically, it is diﬃcult to identify over-reaction because we do not know what the correct
reaction should be. That being said, we can compare how above- and below-median lenders
diﬀer in their investment choices over time. If less sophisticated lenders were too optimistic in
funding loans of lower grades (say E-HR) but over-react when these E-HR loans become late or
default, we should observe their earlier portfolios to have too many E-HR loans but their later
investments to have too few E-HR loans, both relative to the above-median lenders from the
same lender cohort. Figures 7 and 8 (and corresponding regression results in Table 8) clearly
reject this speculation: the below-median type does invest more in E-HR loans initially and
shies away from them later on, but they never devote a signiﬁcantly smaller proportion of their
investment to E-HR than the above-median type. Nor do they invest disproportionally more
in A-AA grades. Note that the comparison is only relative: data suggest that below-median
lenders do not over-react more than above-median lenders; but it is still possible that above-
median lenders have over-reacted to either market wide performance or the outcome of their
own portfolios.
7.2 Market-wide learning
Since the market-wide performance of Prosper is simply a time-series, it is impossible to dis-
entangle learning of market-wide performance from the impact of other macroeconomic factors.
That being said, if we can isolate some part of market performance that seems more relevant
to a lender, we can examine how the lender responds to this part of information in addition to
market-wide performance or unobservable macroeconomic factors.
Here, we examine whether a lender that belongs to group g adjusts his investment in response
to the performance of the loans funded by other lenders in the same group. This test does not
formally identify learning from the market, but it does show whether lenders learn from loan
performance at a more aggregate level than their own portfolios. More speciﬁcally, for lender
i at week t, we calculate the percent late for all the loans funded by his group up to week
t − 1 (excluding i’s own portfolio) and add this GroupLateg,t−1 variable on the right hand
side of Equations 5, 6, and 11. In Panel A of Table 9 the coeﬃcient on this group portfolio
performance measure is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the funding regression, but small
and not statistically signiﬁcant in the regressions describing the amount funded and IRR of
funded loans. In addition the own portfolio percent late coeﬃcients are very similar to those
initially reported in Table 5 for the latter two regressions. This suggests that, in addition to
the marketwide ﬂuctuation (controlled for by week ﬁxed eﬀects), an average group lender does
learn on the extensive margin (i.e. propensity to fund new loans) from the performance of other
23loans funded by his group’s members, but conditional on funding, does not change the types of
loans funded. While the lack of learning from the group’s portfolio in terms of IRR could be
explained by a lender viewing group loans as charity lending, results reported in Freedman and
Jin (2008) suggest that lenders shy away from borrowers with group aﬃlation when previously
funded group loans misperform, both within their own groups and across all group aﬃliated
borrowers.
Our second test to infer market wide learning is to examine whether later cohorts of lenders
respond less to the percent late of their own loans than do earlier cohorts. If later cohorts have
learned from the market performance that occurred before they joined Prosper, they would
have a more precise prior about the meaning of borrower attributes and therefore adjust their
posterior belief less when their own portfolios misperform. To identify this eﬀect, we interact
PortLateit−1 with cohort dummies in Equations 5, 6, and 11. Here cohorts are deﬁned in six
month periods. While our sample only includes lending activity after June 2006, it still includes
lenders who joined Prosper prior to this date. Therefore, the ﬁrst cohort, which is the reference
group, contains those lenders who began lending on Prosper during the ﬁrst half of 2006. As
shown in Panel B of Table 9, the coeﬃcients on the cohort interaction terms are all of opposite
signs to the main eﬀect. This pattern implies that lenders in latter cohorts respond less to
the late loans in their portfolios as compared to the ﬁrst cohort on both the extensive funding
margin and the intensive margin regarding the quality of their chosen loans. One caveat in
interpreting these results is that the latest cohorts have had less opportunity to observe late
loans in their portfolios, which could lead to the decreased relationship between late loans and
lending behavior, particularly the large negative coeﬃcient on the interaction between percent
late and the last cohort (the second half of 2008) in the IRR regression.
To track across- and within-cohort changes, Figure 9 plots the average lender’s IRR8 for
loans he funds in a given week by lender cohort. Here lender cohort is deﬁned by the quarter
in which the lender funded his ﬁrst loan. Consistent with the learning evidence, as lenders age
they fund loans with a higher rate of return. Moreover, new cohorts pick up the market trend,
perhaps responding to information revealed by the market that was not available when older
lenders joined Prosper. To push this point further, recall in Table 8 that the gap between above-
and below-median lenders is smaller for later cohorts. This suggests that new lenders are not
a simple replicate of the old cohorts; new cohorts have less heterogeneity, potentially because
they learn some information from prior market performance before funding their ﬁrst loans.
Overall, the evidence suggests that lenders have watched the market before joining Prosper
but once they are on Prosper they respond to the performance of their own portfolio in addition
to signals from their own group or the whole market.
247.3 Better watching than doing?
If for behavioral or psychological reasons Prosper lenders are biased by the outcomes of their
own portfolios, watching the market (without lending) may allow a prospective lender to better
digest market-wide information and obtain better information than active lenders. Conversely,
if it is easier to learn from one’s own portfolio performance than following a continuous update
of market-wide information, learning by doing may be more informative than watching the
market.48 We try to distinguish these two stories by comparing diﬀerent cohorts at a snapshot
in time which includes a distribution of new and old cohorts. Assuming the macroeconomic
environment aﬀects them equally, if the new cohort on average makes better choice of loans than
the old cohorts, it suggests that watching the market may be more informative than learning by
doing.
Speciﬁcally, we regress lender i’s average IRR8 of all the loans he funded in week t as a
function of whether this lender is new at t (i.e. has been a Prosper lender for less than a
month and therefore has not observed any performance of his own portfolio), the lender’s age
(in months) if he is not new, and week ﬁxed eﬀects.
(13) AvgIRR8it = β1 · Newit + β2 · Ageit + FEt + ǫit
As shown in Table 10, if we do not control for the age of old cohorts, the coeﬃcient of the new
dummy suggests that new lenders on average pick loans that have 0.31 percentage points higher
expected rate of return than the average old lender at the same point in time. This suggests
that, on average, a new lender watching the market has better information on the meaning of
loan attributes than those who learn by doing on Prosper. Note that this could be driven by
a selection eﬀect: those who join Prosper later may be more sophisticated than earlier lenders
because they are endowed with better information about consumer lending before observing
any Prosper activities, or because they have a better ability to extract useful information from
Prosper data. Either way, our results do not necessarily imply that the same lender would do
better by joining Prosper in a later period.
The second column of Table 10 reports both coeﬃcients of New and Age. The coeﬃcient
of New remains signiﬁcant but becomes larger in magnitude (0.74 percentage points vs. 0.31
percentage points), while the coeﬃcient of Age is positive and signﬁcant (0.06 percentage points).
These results suggest that watching the market does not always dominate learning by doing:
new cohorts pick better loans than existing young cohorts, but when a previous cohort becomes
older than 11 months, it may do as well or even better than the new cohort.
48If lenders learn about their own preference say risk tolerance) instead of the meaning of loan attributes,
learning by doing could be more informative as well.
257.4 Lender evolution
What does the new-versus-old comparison say about the nature of lender heterogeneity and
lender evolution? To answer this question, it is necessary to combine the previous result with an
intriguing fact mentioned above: Table 8 suggests that the initial gap of IRR8 between above-
and below-median lenders in the same cohort will converge to zero in (0.084-0.026)/0.004=14.5
months; by comparison it takes (0.084-0.026)/0.001=58 cohorts for this initial gap to become
zero. In other words, below-median lenders become more similar to the above-median lenders
within a cohort than they do across cohorts over the same time frame. What patterns of
heterogeneity and learning would lead to these facts?
We suspect the reality is that there is a continuum of lender types. Some lenders choose to
watch the market ﬁrst so that they can process more market-wide information before lending
money on Prosper. If lenders who spend more time researching the market before lending
perform better, new above-median lenders may be on average more sophisticated than old above-
median lenders that have aged up to the same calender time and remain active (in funding new
loans). To see this, suppose the new above-median lenders were not as sophisticated as an aged
above-median lender. To be consistent with the fact that the above/below diﬀerence of IRR8 is
larger in the new cohort than in an aged old cohort, the average IRR8 of the new cohort must be
lower than the aged old cohort. However, this contradicts the fact that new lenders on average
do better than old cohorts at a speciﬁc time. This logic suggests that new above-median lenders
must be more sophisticated initially than old above-median lenders on average.
By comparison, the relatively unsophisticated lenders may have diﬃculty digesting market-
wide information but learn from experience. In Panel C of Table 9 we rerun Equations 5,
6, and 11 including an interaction between 1abovemedian and PortLatei(t−1). As expected, the
above-median type responds signiﬁcantly less to the lateness of their own portfolio than the
below-median lenders in terms of the IRR of funded loans. To the extent that learning by
doing is more salient for below-median lenders, aged below-median lenders that remain active
on Prosper could become more sophisticated than new below-median lenders. In the meantime,
the diﬃculty of processing market-wide information keeps the new below-median lenders at low
sophistication, which explains why the above/below-median diﬀerence of IRR8 declines very
slowly across cohorts. Interestingly, the regression suggests that above-median lenders respond
more on the funding margin than the below-median lenders if they observe the same amount of
PortLate. In reality, above-median lenders observe systematically less default or late in their
own portfolios (because of their sophistication and reluctance to invest a lot in the beginning)
and therefore slightly surpass below-median lenders in the likelihood of funding any new loans
after week 16 (Appendix Figure 12).
268 Conclusion
We examine how online lenders in a peer-to-peer lending market cope with information asym-
metry that is likely to be exaggerated on the Internet. Evidence suggests that individual lenders
on Prosper.com do face serious information problems because they do not observe borrowers’
complete credit history and Prosper borrowers may have adversely selected the website as they
have diﬃculty obtaining credit in oﬄine markets.
Ex-post performance data suggest that many lenders fund loans of low expected returns and
they learn to shy away from risky loans over time. While we cannot rule out charity or fun as
potential motivations, the most likely explanation is that lenders, especially those who joined
Prosper early, lacked expertise in risk evaluation. Learning by doing plays an important role in
addressing the problem, but there remains a large amount of lender heterogeneity. Consistent
with the literature of ineﬃcient markets, we observe that some lenders are better informed than
others. We ﬁnd that the gap between more and less sophisticated lenders closes gradually over
time, both within cohorts and across cohorts. Because convergence within cohorts is faster than
the convergence across cohorts, there is still a wide range of heterogeneity in expected returns
at the end of our sample.
Our ﬁndings are not inconsistent with P2P lending’s rapid growth on the Interenet. We
suspect part of the observed prosperity was driven by unsophisticated lenders who drastically
underestimated borrower risk on the Internet, which in turn has attracted risky borrowers to
populate the website. As lenders learn the actual risk, the initial mistake-driven prosperity
would not be sustainable in the long run. This explains why over time the P2P market has
excluded more and more subprime borrowers and evolved towards the population served by
traditional credit markets. In fact, at the end of our sample period, the funding rate of risky
listings had become so low that when Prosper reopened in July 2009 (after the SEC review) it
began dissallowing any borrower with a credit score below 640 (i.e. grade D or below) to list on
the website.49 The extent to which P2P lending can compete with traditional banks for prime
borrowers remains an open question. P2P lending may have advantages in terms of search cost
savings or online social networks. We have examined the latter in Freedman and Jin (2008) and
will consider the former in future research.
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Table 1: Summary of Listings and Loans by Quarter  
(Sample period: June 1, 2006 – July 31, 2008) 
 
Listings:             














20062  5,375  26.65  4,957.22  16.86% 
20063  19,771  107.25  5,424.63  18.15% 
20064  31,629  196.57  6,214.85  17.45% 
20071  31,373  263.22  8,389.94  16.72% 
20072  37,505  331.62  8,841.98  17.51% 
20073  39,353  328.79  8,355.00  18.06% 
20074  41,585  334.23  8,037.29  18.41% 
20081  33,485  250.14  7,470.30  19.24% 
20082  43,371  318.53  7,344.20  24.50% 
20083  10,361  73.48  7,092.42  26.40% 
Total  293,808  2230.48  7,591.62  19.19% 
Loans:             













20062  385  1.47  3,822.17  19.03% 
20063  1,934  9.37  4,844.63  19.41% 
20064  2,403  11.54  4,804.05  18.97% 
20071  3,079  19.93  6,472.60  17.37% 
20072  3,118  23.47  7,527.98  17.42% 
20073  2,671  18.43  6,900.12  17.31% 
20074  2,593  18.98  7,320.17  17.11% 
20081  3,074  20.47  6,658.94  17.37% 
20082  4,344  26.33  6,061.10  17.98% 
20083  1,407  8.27  5,877.70  19.39% 
Total  25,008  158.27  6,328.65  17.90% 
Note: Authors’ tabulations from Prosper listing and loan data.31 
 
Table 2: Summary of Listings and Loans by Credit Grade 
Credit 
Grade 
Prosper Listings  Prosper Loans 
Experian Accounts 
















As of 2/21/2009 
Conditional on loan 
life = 24 months, 
observed by 2/21/09  observed on 9/2005 







% 3m late 
or worse  
(DTI<0.2)
 
% 3m late or worse 
(loan life = 2 years) 
2A  9321  11.57%  32.08%  2990  9.70%  1.61%  11.81%  12.54%  8.70%  4.48%  0.89% 
A  11099  14.05%  25.45%  2825  12.29%  1.70%  19.61%  20.35%  16.70%  9.23%  3.33% 
B  17211  16.47%  21.88%  3766  15.00%  2.79%  26.50%  27.54%  22.55%  19.55%  6.04% 
C  30843  18.57%  15.76%  4862  17.49%  2.98%  30.65%  31.45%  26.70%  23.44%  9.44% 
D  43282  20.08%  10.35%  4479  20.66%  3.35%  33.53%  34.49%  30.34%  27.56%  15.29% 
E  52000  20.65%  5.56%  2891  24.82%  2.59%  44.97%  45.66%  39.13%  37.69%  24.25% 
HR  128633  19.83%  2.39%  3077  24.52%  2.34%  56.55%  57.56%  51.21%  50.66%  34.40% 
NC  1419  17.66%  8.32%  118  22.06%  0.00%  72.03%  72.03%  59.32%  60.32%    
Total  293808  19.19%  8.51%  25008  17.90%  2.57%  32.08%  32.94%  28.95%  26.86%  6.94% 
Note: Funding rate refers to the percentage of listings that become funded loans. Default refers to loans that are 4 months or more late or considered default due 
to bankruptcy. DTI stands for the borrower’s debt to income ratio as reported in the listing. 32 
 

















Listing attributes available before Feb 2007          
Grade=AA  0.696*  -0.032*  -0.330* 
  (21.041)  (-8.258)  (-12.222) 
Grade=A  0.409*  -0.026*  -0.320* 
  (14.144)  (-8.326)  (-14.602) 
Grade=B  0.252*  -0.021*  -0.307* 
  (11.146)  (-6.855)  (-11.137) 
Grade=C  0.095*  -0.016*  -0.298* 
  (8.135)  (-5.175)  (-9.139) 
Grade=D  0.033*  -0.008*  -0.280* 
  (6.020)  (-2.597)  (-8.667) 
Grade=E  0.001  -0.003  -0.218* 
  (0.578)  (-0.889)  (-6.302) 
Grade=HR  -0.005*  -0.003  -0.142** 
  (-2.711)  (-1.068)  (-3.037) 
Amountrequested  -0.000*  0.000*  0.000* 
  (-32.188)  (17.345)  (18.182) 
Autofunded  0.011*  0.036*  0.079* 
  (20.910)  (90.511)  (9.539) 
borrowermaximumrate  0.702*  0.458*  3.705* 
  (38.743)  (17.009)  (10.329) 
borrowermaximumrate2  -1.161*  0.484*  -5.392* 
  (-34.968)  (7.978)  (-7.036) 
Yeshomeowner  0.001***  0.001  -0.047** 
  (1.729)  (0.608)  (-2.559) 
Debt to income ratio  -0.017*  0.004*  0.042* 
  (-15.799)  (5.433)  (3.818) 
debt-to-income * homeowner  0.001**  -0.000  0.010 
  (2.156)  (-0.711)  (1.513) 
having an image  0.005*  -0.001*  -0.014*** 
  (16.152)  (-3.449)  (-1.873) 
length of description  0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000** 
  (18.177)  (-5.380)  (-2.510) 
mention debtconsolidation  0.001**  0.000  -0.018** 
  (2.372)  (0.174)  (-2.556) 
mention business  -0.001*  0.000  0.050* 
  (-3.199)  (1.062)  (6.470) 
mention car  -0.000  0.001**  0.011 
  (-1.207)  (2.524)  (1.289) 
mention mortgage  0.000  0.000  -0.011 
  (0.315)  (0.026)  (-1.191) 
mention health  0.001*  0.001**  0.024* 
  (2.647)  (1.997)  (2.817) 33 
 
mention education  0.000  -0.000  -0.030* 
  (0.016)  (-0.132)  (4.058) 
mention family  0.001*  0.001**  0.024* 
  (2.887)  (2.054)  (2.828) 
mention retirement  -0.001**  -0.001  -0.020 
  (-2.053)  (-1.343)  (-1.266) 
mention pay-day loan  0.003*  0.003*  0.074* 
  (5.157)  (3.113)  (4.852) 
Saidrelisting  0.008*  0.002  -0.011 
  (4.951)  (1.570)  (-0.542) 
count of relisting  -0.000*  0.001*  0.005* 
  (-5.666)  (6.828)  (4.402) 
Currentdelinquencies  -0.001*  0.000*  0.014* 
  (-18.347)  (4.454)  (9.932) 
delinquencies in past 7 yrs  -0.000*  0.000*  -0.001* 
  (-11.790)  (6.091)  (-3.564) 
length of credit history  -0.000*  0.000*  0.000 
  (-7.724)  (3.973)  (1.251) 
totalcreditlines  0.000  0.000**  -0.000 
  (0.438)  (2.171)  (-1.610) 
In public records in past 10 yrs  -0.001*  0.000  0.013* 
  (-8.563)  (0.126)  (3.808) 
# of inquiries in past 6m  -0.001*  0.000*  0.015* 
  (-13.047)  (6.197)  (14.854) 
missing credit info  0.002  -0.005  0.076 
  (0.957)  (-1.359)  (1.229) 
in_a_grp_borrower  0.004*  -0.004*  -0.007 
  (10.464)  (-9.299)  (-0.756) 
have endorsement + nobid by group leader  0.017*  -0.003*  0.020 
  (8.118)  (-2.798)  (0.992) 
have endorsement + bid by group leader  0.096*  -0.005*  0.015 
  (21.708)  (-7.294)  (1.301) 
have endorsement + nobid by friend  0.002*  0.001**  0.014 
  (5.304)  (2.367)  (1.528) 
have endorsement + bid by friend  0.050*  -0.007*  -0.086* 
  (12.454)  (-6.150)  (-5.713) 
Year-week FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  293,802  25,008  24,995 
Adjusted R2  0.375  0.855  0.163 
The sample includes all the listings and loans between June 1, 2006 and July 31, 2008. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1. All regressions control for state dummies, year-week FE, macro variables, variables 
for prosper environment, duration of auction, and indicators for missing debt-to-income ratio and other credit 
attributes. All regressions do not include the new credit variables added after Feb. 12, 2007.  In an unreported table, 
we show that regressions including these variables and condition on the post-Feb-2007 sample generate similar 
results. 34 
 
Table 4: Half Grade Regressions 
 
Unit of observation = census division by month by half-grade interval 
Sample: the half-grade intervals that have credit scores at or above 520 










% late in 6m  % late in 
12m 
Dummy of minus grade  11.381*  1.908*  0.006  0.004*  0.014**  0.023* 
  (4.962)  (4.124)  (0.671)  (2.989)  (2.213)  (2.825) 
N  3,978  3,978  3,779  3,357  2,776  2,006 
R2  0.679  0.552  0.269  0.795  0.145  0.208 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1. All regressions control for credit grade FE, year-month FE,  
and census-division FE, standard errors clustered by census division. Performance data are as of August 1, 2008. 
 
Table 5: Lender Responses to Ever Late Loans  
          Conditional on Funding a Loan in Week t 
          % of Investment in:     
  Funded a Loan  Amount Funded  AA to A  B to D  E to HR  Mean IRR 
  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
% of Portfolio Ever Late 
-0.078*    -795.256*          0.198*  ￿
(-16.401)    (-10.999)          (39.164)  ￿
% of NC Loans Ever Late 
  -0.116*    -183.335*  0.062*  0.046*  -0.078*    0.041* 
  (-13.269)    (-3.521)  (5.655)  (3.487)  (-8.662)    (13.288) 
% of E to HR Loans Ever Late 
  -0.080*    -125.933*  0.159*  0.052*  -0.211*    0.038* 
  (-21.487)    (-5.833)  (17.567)  (5.380)  (-30.943)    (19.043) 
% of B to D Loans Ever Late 
  -0.105*    -405.820*  0.475*  -0.416*  -0.061*    0.071* 
  (-24.743)    (-9.870)  (24.223)  (-21.191)  (-6.273)    (18.048) 
% of A to AA Loans Ever Late 
  -0.126*    -255.409*  -0.146*  0.087*  0.060*    0.016* 
  (-22.661)    (-5.956)  (-10.693)  (5.541)  (5.436)    (4.045) 
N  2,564,481  2,564,481  553,117  553,117  553,117  553,117  553,117  550,789  550,789 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1. Column 1 is a linear probability model and all other columns are OLS regressions.  
Standard errors are clustered at the lender level.35 
 
Table 6: Summary of IRR Measures 
 
               per  loan        per dollar  per lender 
  
misperformance 
measure  macro  # of loans  mean 
standard 





macro  mean  mean 
IRR1  default  no macro  24996  -0.68%  10.89%  -94.92%  35.21%  -3.05%  -1.86%  -1.61% 
IRR2  default  real macro  5736  -3.40%  13.26%  -91.82%  28.88%  -3.40%  -2.47%  -2.27% 
IRR3  default  rolling forecast  24995  4.70%  17.94%  -99.84%  41.20%  -1.48%  2.36%  2.27% 
IRR4  default  forecast 6/1/06  24997  2.40%  12.13%  -99.70%  36.82%  -0.06%  2.71%  2.72% 
IRR5  miss payment  no macro  24996  -6.38%  13.12%  -96.12%  29.33%  -9.64%  -7.63%  -7.19% 
IRR6  miss payment  real macro  5735  -9.80%  15.60%  -93.07%  2.56%  -9.80%  -8.66%  -8.04% 
IRR7  miss payment  rolling forecast  24995  0.18%  18.85%  -100.00%  41.20%  -9.10%  -2.51%  -1.03% 
IRR8  miss payment  forecast 6/1/06  24996  -4.13%  13.99%  -99.99%  32.86%  -7.32%  -4.03%  -3.75% 
IRR9  default or late  no macro  24996  -7.35%  13.49%  -96.13%  29.33%  -10.59%  -8.71%  -8.24% 
IRR10  default or late  real macro  5736  -10.68%  15.86%  -93.09%  25.59%  -10.68%  -9.68%  -8.98% 
IRR11  default or late  rolling forecast  24995  -0.93%  20.14%  -100.00%  41.20%  -9.86%  -4.01%  -3.52% 
IRR12  default or late  forecast 6/1/06  24997  -4.98%  14.37%  -100.00%  32.86%  -8.31%  -4.92%  -4.60%  
Note: All numbers reported are conditional on convergence in the calculation of IRR. Our full sample has 25008 loans, about 10 of them drop out of the probit 
regression of loan performance because one of the listing attributes predicts the performance perfectly. We do not calculate IRR for these loans. Conditional on 
have predicted monthly performance, at most 1 loan does not meet the convergence criteria of IRR. IRR2, IRR6 and IRR10 have significant fewer observations 
because they are conditional on the loans that have observed real macro variables in all the 36 months of loan life. 36 
 
Table 7: Above and Below Median Lender First Month Characteristics 
Fraction of Portfolio by Grade 
Total Portfolio Size  Number of Loans  $ per Loan  AAtoA  BtoD  EtoHR 
Below Cohort Median IRR8 
Mean  860.27  9.08  98.65  0.36  0.47  0.17 
Median  300.00  5.00  51.25  0.25  0.50  0.00 
SD  2553.03  14.16  366.19  0.37  0.35  0.29 
SE  16.95  0.09  2.43  0.0024  0.0023  0.0019 
N  22696  22696  22696  22696  22696  22696 
Above Cohort Median IRR8 
Mean  823.84  9.91  93.38  0.38  0.57  0.05 
Median  300.00  4.00  50.00  0.33  0.60  0.00 
SD  2148.36  17.14  323.29  0.35  0.35  0.15 
SE  14.22  0.11  2.14  0.0023  0.0023  0.0010 
N  22840  22840  22840  22840  22840  22840 
t test p-value  0.099  0.000  0.104  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Table provides summary statistics of loans made by lenders within their first 4 weeks on Prosper. Above and below 
median split is determined within each weekly cohort of lenders. 
 
 
Table 8: Detection of Lender Heterogeneity in Initial Sophistication  
   IRR8 
% of new 
loans in 
AAtoA 
% of new 
loans in 
BtoD 
% of new 
loans in 
EtoHR 
   coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t 
Dummy of Above-median IRR in first- 
month portfolio 
0.084*  0.211*  0.010  -0.212* 
(56.167)  (30.016)  (1.473)  (-39.379) 
Dummy of above-median * Second Month  -0.026*       
  (-25.692)       
Dummy of above-median * lender age  -0.004*  -0.012*  0.000  0.011* 
  (-28.500)  (-11.952)  (0.413)  (30.610) 
Dummy of above-median * lender cohort   -0.001*  -0.012*  0.004*  0.008* 
  (-13.179)  (-25.978)  (8.418)  (27.679) 
Dummy of above-median * lender cohort *  
lender age 
-0.00018*  0.00100*  -0.00074*  -0.00024* 
(-12.887)  (9.232)  (-7.411)  (-6.613) 
N  513,603  514,636  514,636  514,636 
Adjusted R2  0.080  0.056  0.023  0.099 
Unit of observation is defined by lender-week. The sample includes all the lenders that started on Prosper since June 1, 
2006. Cohort is defined as the count of months from June 2006. Lender age is measured in month since the first day of 
investment on Prosper. Regression controls for cohort fixed effects, lender age fixed effects and year-week fixed effects. 




Table 9: Heterogeneous Learning  
























-0.031*  -617.450*  0.204*  % of 
Portfolio 
Ever Late 
-0.167*  -1,161.596*  0.237*  % of 
Portfolio 
Ever Late 
-0.058*  -709.569*  0.246* 
(-4.27)  (-6.201)  (16.262)  (-9.340)  (-4.102)  (16.675)  (-10.70)  (-11.556)  (49.2) 
% of Group  
Portfolio  
Ever Late 
-0.101*  -27.157  -0.022  X 2006 
Half 2 
0.073*  384.006  -0.019  X Above- 
median 
-0.031*  -41.606  -0.164* 
(-3.43)  (-0.204)  (-1.283)  (3.89)  (1.403)  (-1.306)  (-3.38)  (-0.706)  (-23.429) 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
X 2007  
Half 1 
0.108*  453.434***  -0.056* 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(5.74)  (1.659)  (-3.679) 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
X 2007 
Half 2 
0.142*  572.299**  -0.100* 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(7.07)  (1.987)  (-5.124) 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
X 2008  
Half 1 
0.136*  331.377  -0.241* 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(4.75)  (0.969)  (-6.254) 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ N   499,575  81,394   80,905  N  2,564,481  553,117  550,789  N  2,371,593  514,636  513,603 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1. The Funded a Loan columns are linear probability model and all other columns are OLS 
regressions. The Amount Funded and IRR8 regression samples are conditional on funding a loan in week t.  Standard errors are clustered at the lender level. 
 
Table 10: Cohort Difference within a Snapshot of Time 
   IRR8  IRR8 
   coef/t  coef/t 
=1 if lender is new on Prosper in 
his first month 
0.003*  0.007* 
(7.139)  (15.569) 
# of months that the lender has 
been on Prosper  
  0.001* 
  (14.898) 
N  550,789  550,789 
Adjusted R2  0.025  0.026 
  
Unit of observation is defined by lender-week. Cohort is defined as the count of months from June 2006. 
Lender age is measured in month since the first day of investment on Prosper. Regression controls for year-
week fixed effects. T-stat in parentheses. *p<0.01, **p<0.05, ***p<0.1. 38 
 
 
Figure 1A: CDF of Prosper and Experian Listings 
 
Figure 1B: PDF of Prosper Listings by Time 
 
Figure 1C: PDF of Prosper and Experian Loans by Time 39 
 
Figure 2: IRRs by Macro Controls   
 
Vertical lines indicate Prosper's Feb. 12, 2007 policy of redefining E 
and HR plus posting more credit information and Oct. 30, 2007 
introduction of bidder guidance. 
Figure 3: IRR8 Distribution by Grade 
  
Figure presents kernel densities of IRR for each grade category. 
 Figure 4: IRR8 by Grade and Loan Origination Month 
 
Vertical lines indicate Prosper's Feb. 12, 2007 policy of redefining E 
and HR plus posting more credit information and Oct. 30, 2007 
introduction of bidder guidance. 
 
Figure 5: Mean of IRR8, Contract Rate and Predicted 
Performance by Loan Origination Month 
 
Vertical lines indicate Prosper's Feb. 12, 2007 policy of redefining E 
and HR plus posting more credit information and Oct. 30, 2007 
introduction of bidder guidance. 
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Figure 6: Average IRR8 of New investments by Lender Age and 
Initial Portfolio  IRR8 
 
Above and below median split is determined within each weekly cohort 
of lenders. 
Figure 7: Percentage of AA to A loans by Age and Initial 
Portfolio IRR8 
 
Above and below median split is determined within each weekly 
cohort of lenders. 
Figure 8: Percentage of E to HR Loans by Age and Initial Portfolio 
IRR8 
 
Above and below median split is determined within each weekly cohort 
of lenders. 
Figure 9: Average IRR8 of New Investments by Investment 
Date and Lender Cohort 
 
Cohorts refer to 6 month period in which a lender funds his first 
loan on Prosper. 
 Appendix – Not for Publication – IRR algorithm and robustness checks
As described in the main text, we compute the expected IRR by ﬁrst using the ob-
served ex post loan performance to predict a relationship between listing attributes and
loan performance, and then calculating a compounded annual discount factor that equal-
izes the loan amount to the present value of all the predicted monthly cash inﬂow. In this
Appendix, we present evidence on the ﬁt of our main probit model in performance predic-
tion, describe how IRR changes when we use duration or an alternative probit model to
predict loan performance, and ﬁnally discuss the potential bias in the absolute measure
of IRR.
Fit of the Main Probit Model To predict monthly cash inﬂow (for a lender), we
need to estimate whether a loan will misperform or pay oﬀ the whole loan in a spe-
ciﬁc month. Appendix Figure 2 contrasts the real data with the predicted probability
of miss payment under real macro, rolling forecast of macro, and the macro forecast as
of 6/1/2006. From loan month 1 to 36, the prediction with the realized macroeconomic
variables closely ﬁts the real data, with close to zero prediction error for each month.
Miss payment predicted with rolling forecast and forecast as of 6/1/2006 are systemati-
cally lower than the real performance because lenders did not expect the macroeconomic
downturn. This point is more obvious in Appendix Figure 3 which presents the same
prediction by calendar month instead of loan life. It seems that lender forecast started to
deviate from the real macro after July 2008, which is reasonable given the fact that the
subprime crisis broke out in the wholesale ﬁnancial market in August 2007 and it took
time for it to spread to consumer lending. Appendix Figures 4 and 5 show the predicted
probability of a loan being paid oﬀ by a speciﬁc month. Consistent with lender optimism,
the forecast probabilities of paid oﬀ are systematically higher than the real data and the
prediction made from real macro.
An Alternative Probit Model One caveat of the main probit model is that it
predicts paid oﬀ and misperformance separately, although they are exclusive to each other.
This opens a possibility that the predicted probability of on time payment, deﬁned by
1-prob(payoﬀ)-prob(misperformance), may be below zero. In an alternative probit model
we make an additional prediction on the probability of [ever paid oﬀ by or misperformance
in month t]. This does not solve the problem completely, as other parts of the cash ﬂow
formula uses the probability of paid oﬀ separately. However, if the IRRs computed with
the additional probit prediction are similar to what we have reported in the main text, it
A1shows that our results are robust to this speciﬁcation.
Appendix Table 3 reports the IRRs estimated under this alternative probit. To fa-
cilitate comparison with the duration model to be described below, we measure misper-
formance by default or [default or late]. Miss payment is excluded because the duration
model does not allow the studied event to switch on and oﬀ over time, and ever missing
a payment is equivalent to counting both default and late as misperformance. As shown
in Appendix Table 3, the alternative probit model yields slightly diﬀerent IRRs as com-
pared to Table 6, but IRRs by misperformance measure and macro treatment follow the
same pattern as before: counting late as misperformance predicts much lower IRRs and
IRRrealmacro < IRRforecast060106 < IRRrollingforecast. The distribution of these IRRs by
grade, time, cohort and lender age is similar to what is reported in the main text.
Duration model At the ﬁrst glance, the time passed until the event of pay oﬀ or
misperformance occurs lends itself to a duration model. A typical duration model does
not allow borrowers to switch between misperformance and on-time payment, but it is
likely a small problem given the fact that most borrowers who missed a payment are
likely to default eventually. A more compelling reason that motivates us to choose a
probit speciﬁcation over a duration model is that the duration model does not predict the
real data as well as probit.
More speciﬁcally, we use a Cox proportional hazard model to predict the probability
of paid oﬀ by month t and the probability of [paid oﬀ or misperformance by month t].
Appendix Figures 6-9 compare these two predicted probabilities using probit and duration
to the real data. It is clear that probit predictions ﬁt the real data very well, but duration
predictions have more errors, especially at later calendar times and later loan lives (when
we have fewer observations). Since the duration model requires us to infer the probability
of a loan being paid oﬀ at exactly month t, an error in the prediction of paid oﬀ duration
will be carried over to that inference. In comparison, in the main (and alternative) probit
model we run a separate probit regression directly to predict this probability and therefore
avoid the sequential prediction error.
Appendix Table 3 also presents the IRRs based on the duration model. While the
absolute magnitude of the duration model is somewhat diﬀerent from that of the main
(and alternative) probit model, the relationship across misperformance measures and
diﬀerent macro treatments is the same as before. Again, the distribution of duration-
based IRRs by grade, time, cohort and lender age is similar to what we have reported in
the main text.
A2Potential bias No matter which prediction model we use, our IRR algorithm is
subject to potential bias in both directions. On the one hand, our IRR estimates may
be downward biased because we try to be conservative in the calculation of cash ﬂows.
Speciﬁcally, we assume away any loss recovery from default loans, and we do not account
for the late fees that a lender may receive from a late-but-non-defaulting borrower. When
we count early payoﬀ as a bulk cash ﬂow that arrives in the paid-oﬀ month, it eﬀectively
assumes that the paid oﬀ amount is reinvested in a loan that is identical to the loan under
study. This assumption may be conservative because lenders may learn to fund better
loans over time.
On the other hand, our IRR estimates may have overestimated the return on invest-
ment because we do not consider any cost that lenders may incur in processing Prosper
information. The time that lenders spend on screening listings and digesting Prosper his-
tory could be long and stressful. Lastly, our IRR estimates are based on the average loan
performance observed from June 1, 2006 to February 21, 2010, a period that stretches
from the end of a boom to an economy-wide recession. If the future economy becomes





Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics of Listing Attributes (June 1, 2006 – July 31, 2008) 
   Listings  Loans 
  Mean  STD  N  Mean  STD  N 
Information available before Feb. 12, 2007             
Grade=AA  0.032  0.175  293808  0.120  0.324  25008 
Grade=A  0.038  0.191  293808  0.113  0.317  25008 
Grade=B  0.059  0.235  293808  0.151  0.358  25008 
Grade=C  0.105  0.307  293808  0.194  0.396  25008 
Grade=D  0.147  0.354  293808  0.179  0.383  25008 
Grade=E  0.177  0.382  293808  0.116  0.320  25008 
Grade=HR  0.438  0.496  293808  0.123  0.328  25008 
Grade=NC  0.005  0.069  293808  0.005  0.069  25008 
amountrequested  7592  6388  293808  6329  5679  25008 
autofunded  0.311  0.463  293808  0.263  0.441  25008 
borrowermaximumrate  0.192  0.084  293808  0.209  0.074  25008 
yeshomeowner  0.327  0.469  293808  0.441  0.497  25008 
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio  0.505  1.359  293808  0.330  0.978  25008 
missing DTI  0.068  0.251  293808  0.035  0.183  25008 
DTI topcoded if DTI>=10  0.083  0.275  293808  0.044  0.205  25008 
have image  0.515  0.500  293808  0.659  0.474  25008 
length of listing desc (in chars)  1058  772  293808  1295  866  25008 
mention debt consolidation  0.358  0.480  293808  0.375  0.484  25008 
mention business loan  0.231  0.421  293808  0.271  0.444  25008 
mention car  0.689  0.463  293808  0.626  0.484  25008 
mention mortgage  0.139  0.346  293808  0.187  0.390  25008 
mention health  0.721  0.449  293808  0.790  0.407  25008 
mention education  0.211  0.408  293808  0.248  0.432  25008 
mention family  0.179  0.383  293808  0.189  0.392  25008 
mention retirement  0.030  0.171  293808  0.041  0.199  25008 
mention pay-day loan  0.057  0.233  293808  0.057  0.231  25008 
concede relisting  0.008  0.089  293808  0.021  0.144  25008 
# of listings (incld current one)  2.811  3.361  293808  2.912  2.863  25008 
interest rate cap  0.243  0.093  293808  0.273  0.082  25008 
borrower fee  1.800  0.794  293808  1.548  0.781  25008 
lender fee  0.852  0.231  293808  0.790  0.258  25008 
amountdelinquent ($)  3516  12374  221618  1176  6257  18618 
missing amountdelinquent  0.004  0.066  221618  0.001  0.037  18618 
currentdelinquency  3.833  5.303  293808  1.454  3.400  25008 
delinquency in 7yrs  11.022  16.450  293808  5.800  12.356  25008 
lengthcredithistory (in days)  152.208  84.472  293808  158.049  87.107  25008 
totalcreditlines  24.354  14.393  293808  23.964  14.424  25008 
in public records in past 10 years  0.657  1.395  293808  0.405  0.936  25008 
# of inquiries in past 6 months  4.153  4.959  293808  2.927  3.979  25008  
A5 
 
Appendix Table 1 Continued: Summary Statistics of Listing Attributes (June 1, 2006 – July 31, 2008) 
   Listings  Loans 
   Mean  STD  N  Mean  STD  N 
Credit info added after Feb. 12, 2007                   
currentcreditlines  8.230  6.001  221618  9.566  5.931  18618 
opencreditlines  7.224  5.303  221618  8.165  5.223  18618 
band card utilization rate  0.629  0.431  221618  0.547  0.373  18618 
revolving balance ($)  12087  31802  221618  16326  39388  18618 
in publice records in past 1 year  0.075  0.346  221618  0.040  0.237  18618 
working full time  0.821  0.383  221618  0.859  0.348  18618 
working part time  0.040  0.196  221618  0.038  0.192  18618 
income 25-75 K  0.670  0.470  202271  0.651  0.477  17782 
income > 75K  0.144  0.351  202271  0.220  0.415  17782 
missing income  0.297  0.457  293808  0.284  0.451  25008 
no employment or income reported  0.014  0.119  293808  0.005  0.072  25008 
missing new credit info posted after 2/07  0.000  0.013  293808  0.000  0.018  25008 
missing credit info posted bef 2/07  0.008  0.087  293808  0.004  0.062  25008 
Social network variables                    
borrower in a group  0.288  0.453  293808  0.421  0.494  25008 
borrower having any friend  0.191  0.393  293808  0.249  0.432  25008 
listing with endorsement+nobid by group leader  0.010  0.098  293808  0.027  0.162  25008 
listing with endorsement+nobid by friend  0.120  0.325  293808  0.153  0.360  25008 
listing with endorsement+bid by group leader  0.022  0.148  293808  0.117  0.322  25008 




Appendix Table 2: Within Grade Learning 
   Mean IRR of Loans in Grade: 
  AA  A  B  C  D  E  HR 
   coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t  coef/t 
Panel A               
% of Portfolio Ever Late  -0.031*  0.091*  0.123*  0.139*  0.095*  0.083*  0.122* 
  (-7.904)  (7.872)  (14.838)  (14.886)  (7.756)  (4.428)  (4.673) 
N  168,400  175,748  205,632  183,744  130,983  57,765  41,166 
Panel B 
% of NC Loans Ever Late  -0.004**  -0.002  0.007**  0.004  0.007  0.001  0.005 
  (-2.542)  (-0.442)  (2.305)  (1.167)  (1.446)  (0.195)  (0.599) 
% of E to HR Loans Ever Late  -0.002***  -0.000  0.003  0.008**  0.010***  0.060*  0.105* 
  (-1.773)  (-0.111)  (1.242)  (2.532)  (1.932)  (5.149)  (6.026) 
% of B to D Loans Ever Late  -0.012*  0.041*  0.107*  0.136*  0.102*  0.037**  0.000 
  (-4.112)  (4.838)  (15.505)  (15.416)  (8.364)  (2.040)  (0.010) 
% of A to AA loans Ever Late  -0.020*  0.066*  0.014**  0.015**  -0.006  -0.002  -0.008 
(-5.291)  (6.305)  (2.205)  (2.388)  (-0.750)  (-0.157)  (-0.396) 
N  168,400  175,748  205,632  183,744  130,983  57,765  41,166 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1. All regression samples are conditional on funding at least one loan in the given grade in week t. 
Standard errors are clustered at the lender level. Samples in Panel C includes cohorts entering Prosper after June 1, 2006.  
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Appendix Table 3: Alternative calculation of IRR (conditional on convergence) 
 
               per  loan    
misperformance measure  model  macro  # of loans  mean 
standard 
deviation  min  max 
default  probit  no macro  24997  -0.93%  9.83%  -90.63%  37.56% 
default  probit  real macro  5736  -3.67%  12.83%  -90.81%  29.33% 
default  probit  rolling forecast  24990  6.60%  15.68%  -99.99%  41.20% 
default  probit  forecast 6/1/06  24996  2.23%  12.91%  -99.99%  40.45% 
default  duration  no macro  25000  -4.46%  21.18%  -92.46%  28.60% 
default  duration  real macro  5631  -12.81%  28.94%  -91.27%  27.75% 
default  duration  rolling forecast  24879  8.54%  12.82%  -91.92%  41.20% 
default  duration  forecast 6/1/06  24881  4.70%  12.36%  -92.31%  37.35% 
default or late  probit  no macro  24979  -12.14%  14.11%  -95.65%  25.28% 
default or late  probit  real macro  5731  -16.47%  17.36%  -92.91%  24.36% 
default or late  probit  rolling forecast  24983  -1.05%  20.20%  -99.99%  41.20% 
default or late  probit  forecast 6/1/06  24986  -8.26%  15.87%  -99.99%  32.86% 
default or late  duration  no macro  24991  -10.29%  13.97%  -97.34%  21.94% 
default or late  duration  real macro  5628  -10.65%  17.30%  -94.32%  24.02% 
default or late  duration  rolling forecast  24878  -0.40%  16.41%  -95.19%  41.19% 
default or late  duration  forecast 6/1/06  24879  -4.41%  13.88%  -95.03%  29.56% 
In all versions of IRR, the convergence rate is over 99%. Duration model has fewer loans with valid IRR because some loan characteristics perfectly predict the 
outcome and therefore these loans are dropped in the duration prediction.  
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Appendix Figure 1: Macro Economic Indicators (2005 – June 2008) 
 
 





























Appendix Figure 8: Compare probit and duration model fit, in the prediction of ever paid off or miss 






Appendix Figure 9: Compare probit and duration model fit, in the prediction of ever paid off or miss 














Appendix Figure 11: Across Lender Variance of IRR8 by Age and Initial Portfolio IRR8 
 
Appendix Figure 12: Whether to fund new loan(s) by lender age (excluding month 1), above- and 
below-median lenders separately 
 
 